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ABSTRACT 
Building on the pragmatist philosophical tradition and work done by scholars in the field 
of feminist technological studies, this paper considers abortion as a case study to 
examine how science and technology interact with systems of knowledge, truth, and 
power. Paying special attention to how technological authority and notions of expertise 
have influenced public policy and legislative agendas, I consider the role of technological 
artifacts in shaping our realities and our legal frameworks. Through a historical review 
of changes in abortion policy and in conversation with various social philosophers, I make 
the argument that scientific information has not objectively informed abortion opinion 
and policy, but rather always been a tool of power, reflective of and contributing to 
larger systemic inequalities. Moreover, because the fundamentally nuanced biology of 
human fetal development directly conflicts with the legal and moral urge to clearly 
demarcate personhood from non-personhood, I outline why any attempts to define 
personhood or viability based purely on biological evidence is arbitrary, deceptive, and 
ultimately inappropriate. For this reason, I conclude by advocating for the use of a more 
contextual approach to policy making, considering larger sociopolitical dynamics of 
gendered power and oppression as well as the lived experiences of those impacted 
directly by the legislation. In the current political moment, technology is playing an 
increasingly large role in our lives, and access to abortion and reproductive rights are 
being actively threatened by those in the highest ranks in the US government. This paper 
attempts to provide a deeper understanding of the philosophical journey our society took 
to reach this junction and suggest a better path forward, centering the values of 
democracy, dignity, and justice. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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On February 14th, Kentucky lawmakers on the senate floor listened to the beating heart of a 
pregnant person’s unborn baby projected over loudspeakers before voting to pass a bill that bans 
abortions in all cases where a fetal heartbeat can be detected.17 Republican Senator Matt Castlen 
defended the bill using the same logic used to pass countless similar bills across the nation in the 
coming months, announcing unequivocally, “That child in her womb is a living human being, and 
all living human beings have a right to life” (Schreiner 2019). Fundamentally, this bill, like all 
abortion policy, rests upon the metaphysical and moral questions of what qualifies as human life 
and when human life begins. Senator Castlen, like many contemporary law makers, drew answers 
to these questions from information made possible only through technology – in this case a 
heartbeat detected by vaginal ultrasound – highlighting the power of technology and science in 
shaping the human experience of and in the world and our understanding of complex moral 
issues. 
The realm of law and policy is where answers to these questions become institutionalized and 
conceptions of personhood become operationalized, offering a key space to analyze how scientific 
development influences public health and discourse through its influence on legislation. The 
controversial nature of the debate and rich legal history demonstrates that abortion is a prime 
topic to examine the mutually informed and reinforcing relationship between science, morality, 
power, and policy. It also invites reflection on how scientific knowledge and technology reflect 
and reinforce broader constructions of power and value. Accordingly, this paper will explore 
diverse perspectives relating to ontological personhood with reference to philosophical, 
theological, anthropological, and biological arguments to explore how power and authority are 
inextricably tied to the creation of knowledge. This linkage requires us, if we are operating with 
intellectual integrity, to consciously state our values, and choose to prioritize sources of authority 
that align with those values in the creation of public health policy. This essay will make the case 
that democracy, dignity, and justice are the relevant values at play in choosing sources of authority 
for this issue. Science as a discipline struggles to comment on those values, necessarily abstract 
and ambiguous, which is why progress on narrow, technical questions – such as fetal personhood 
– mistakenly leave the genuine issues by the wayside while maintaining structural inequalities. 
For these reasons, I maintain that scientific authority alone should not dictate reproductive health 
policy. Instead, this paper will argue that the conversation about abortion will only address the 
most important questions if we consider the broader context surrounding this issue and explicitly 
incorporate appropriate sources of moral and intellectual authority in the policy making process 
alongside scientific knowledge.  
A PRAGMATIST ACCOUNT OF TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE 
Various philosophers and historians of science, especially those of the pragmatist tradition, 
contend that so-called scientific “truths” are not absolute, apolitical, nor objective, but socially 
constructed, open to change and influenced by power and political interests (Rorty 1991; Kuhn 
1979; Latour & Woolgar 1986; James 1907; Dewey 1927). For example, emphasizing the fluid and 
procedural nature of verifying truths in the general sense, leading American philosopher William 
James wrote that, “The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens 
to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events.” (1902: 920, my emphasis). Likewise, Bruno 
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Latour and Steve Woolgar, both sociologists of science, challenge rationalist ideas about truth and 
consider science specifically as a discipline according to a pragmatist framework. In an 
anthropological account of life in a laboratory, they explain how scientific facts are neither 
objective nor intrinsic reflections of reality, but rather are created by scientists who are influenced 
by socialization much as any other member of society (Latour & Woolgar 1986). Under this 
construction, knowledge is not necessarily correspondent to reality or “truth” (in the universal, 
impossibly abstract understanding of the word) but instead the outcome of a cyclic process of 
legitimation and consensus building among scientists, which dictates which questions are asked, 
what methods are available for answering said questions, and ultimately what scientists are 
willing to identity as a fact. In his landmark book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
American philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1970) describes these bounded conditions as the existing 
“paradigm,” asserting that all science is necessarily constrained by conceptual, theoretical, 
methodological, and instrumental commitments and assumptions about how the world operates. 
This understanding of knowledge recognizes the inherent subjectivity in all human activity, which 
interacts with the universe and material conditions but necessarily rests on human translation, 
interpretation, and analysis of the material world. While many scholars and practitioners alike 
mistakenly conflate our bounded interpretation of material conditions with notions of 
rationalistic, unbiased truth and assert that science is therefore objective and apolitical (Tyson 
2015), a look at history reveals clearly how scientific facts have changed periodically and been 
influenced by factors supposedly beyond the bounds of science such as politics, ideological 
interests, and power.  
To illustrate the construction of scientific facts within the larger environment of power 
dynamics, we can consider the notion of biological sex. Sex according to a male/female binary has 
traditionally been considered a neutral category of biological analysis in mainstream Western 
culture, inscribed in laws and resting on the assumption that it is natural and scientifically 
predictable. Meanwhile, gender is often considered to be a more social phenomenon, an identity 
not determined purely by biology. Judith Butler (1999) however, along with other postmodern 
feminist scholars, challenges the commonly held distinction between sex and gender in which sex 
is viewed as biological and gender as culturally constructed. She asserts that both are culturally 
constructed and neither neutral (see also Beauvoir 1949; Delphy 1984; Hood-Williams 1996; Hird 
2000). Employing an approach to discourse and knowledge-power informed by the work of 
French philosopher Michel Foucault, she argues that so called “natural” facts around “biological” 
sex have been discursively produced by scientific discourse in service of other political or social 
interests, chiefly maintaining a hierarchical system of patriarchy. The cultural construction of 
biological sex as a phenomenon is evident in how it does not make sense or exist outside of an 
understanding of and contrast to gender; we can only describe biological sex because we rest on 
assumptions about gender. Butler argues sex is not inherent but rather a product of gender, which 
is a product of the patriarchy. In this way, understanding sex as a neutral, objective, apolitical 
condition of reality mistakenly overlooks the intimate connections between constructions of 
knowledge and broader power dynamics. The result is the perpetuation of unequal power, under 
the dangerous guise of neutral, objective truth. The pragmatist philosophical understanding of 
the construction of scientific facts is therefore core to an analysis of abortion and reproductive 
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rights politics. These policies, and the debates around them, increasingly revolve around 
supposedly neutral scientific arguments without an adequate recognition of their history, social 
context, and inherent relationship to gendered power dynamics.  
In relation to abortion, a similar dynamic is visible in the biological construction of the 
trimester system and conditions of fetal “viability.” These now common concepts are not 
inherently reflective of biological development, but rather products of legal and political pressure 
which has molded scientific research and knowledge creation. Landmark Supreme Court case Roe 
v. Wade (1973) established the constitutional right to obtaining an abortion, qualified with 
temporal conditions under which access is restricted. Growing from an assumption that the state 
has a legitimate interest in protecting both the pregnant person’s health and the “potentiality of 
human life,” the ruling outlines the trimester system and conditions of viability, establishing three 
stages of development where the rights of the pregnant person and the rights of the State (acting 
on behalf of the “potential human life”) compete at “compelling points” as the pregnant person 
approaches term. The ruling asserts that the state obtains the power to regulate abortion only in 
the second trimester, the “stage subsequent to viability.” This profoundly significant legal 
language implies biological articulation of the moment of fetal personhood and scientists have 
consequently made efforts to define viability through technical means. 
Despite the importance of scientifically defining personhood and viability for legal jurisdiction, 
biological study of prenatal development has revealed principally that conception and fetal 
development are continuums, with many points and processes between conception and birth that 
one may relate to be the beginning of human life (Beller & Zlatnik 1995, Flower 1984; Rysavy et 
al. 2015; Jones 1989). Nevertheless, biomedical research has explored a various markers of 
personhood, giving rise to various biological terms such as implantation, conception, viability, 
and neuromaturation that have been strategically employed by policy advocates and philosophers 
alike to argue for the scientific backing of their moral claims about abortion (Brody 1975; 
Goldenring 1985; DeFede 2019; Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith). Ultimately though, 
the grey area inherent in biological development reflects that attempts to demarcate the process 
according to biological attributes are arbitrary and artificial. Scientists have attempted to define 
these categories because lawmakers constructed them. As with sex and gender, the facts reflect 
construction through legal discourse and not any underlying, neutral, objective truth about reality 
or observable material conditions. 
Because knowledge creation is subjective, scientists often have difficulty reaching clear 
technical conclusions when articulating their findings and often refrain from making conclusive 
moral claims. Beller & Zlatnik (1995), for example, in discussion of the trimester system, reflect 
hesitation in using hazy biological evidence as the basis of legal rulings, asserting that, “it is a 
questionable practice to use weeks of pregnancy to determine viability.” They argue that the 
question of viability and fetal personhood is less a scientific enterprise than a “spiritual” one, and 
that the various biological measures of personhood upon which legal jurisdiction are based (i.e. 
neuromaturation, implantation, viability, potentiality) are reflective more so of the political 
interests dominating legislative bodies at the time than fetal developmental reality. Similarly 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Wilms-Crowe 
Volume 16 Issue 1 Fall 2019 19
reflective of the haziness of biological evidence, Flower (1984) discusses the results of his research 
on neuromaturation:  
We can say a few things about fetal neuromaturation with some assurance: central 
nervous system activity begins early in development; fetal motor activity is spontaneous; 
and the neocortex completes its inclusion into the neuraxis after mid-gestation. On the 
other hand, these findings fall far short of serving the tasks we would like to ask of them. 
They permit us to make very little headway on the question of fetal sentience, for example. 
(248)  
Jones (1989) also writes about the failure of his research on electroencephalogram (EEG) 
technology in providing clear evidence in favor of absolutist views of personhood, claiming it 
allows only for generalizations. He asserts that the overwhelming impression of brain 
development is only that of its gradualness and “what follows from that is that, at present at least, 
it is impossible to recognize a distinct point of transition from a 'non-brain' to a 'brain', or from a 
non-functioning nervous system to a functioning one” (176). Scientists themselves seem to 
recognize the subjective nature of their knowledge creation, and the difficulty of coming to clear 
technical solutions. This reflects, perhaps unwittingly to them, the danger of compounding 
scientific truth, authority, law, and morality in a rationalist sense in which scientific truth holds 
unlimited authority over policy and law - and thus our morality and lives.  
Scientists’ tentative positions stand in stark contrast with how some bioethical philosophers 
have appropriated the “evidence” of neuromaturation in moral arguments against abortion. 
Goldenring (1985), for example, asserts that “brain birth” is the morally significant threshold for 
life, at which point abortion becomes morally impermissible. By implying that the brain has a 
definite moment of life and using scientific evidence (albeit misunderstood) in defense of moral 
claims, he not only fails to recognize that scientific facts are not absolute or inherently true but 
also suggests a belief that technical answers have the capacity to answer philosophical or moral 
questions. Legislators have taken a similar approach, visible in the plethora of proposed state 
policies that ban abortion according to technical biological criteria, including conception, 
gestational duration, and viability (Guttmacher Institute 2019). Nevertheless, common across 
discussion among scientists is the conviction that their findings fall short of answering the central 
questions at hand and of urgent desire for policy makers: what constitutes human personhood 
and when does it begin? The fundamentally nuanced biological reality directly conflicts with the 
legal and moral urge to clearly demarcate personhood from non-personhood. This tension makes 
any attempts to define personhood or viability based purely on biological evidence arbitrary, 
deceptive, and ultimately inappropriate.  
TECHNICAL AUTHORITY, MORALITY, AND POWER 
The dynamic interplay between law, science, and morality is not a recent phenomenon and a 
historical account of abortion legislation across time reflects how scientific knowledge has 
influenced and been influenced by social, legal, and political factors. While the contemporary 
context may lead us to assume that abortion has always been a source of controversy or 
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criminalized in some capacity, historical records reveal that abortion was largely a non-issue until 
the 1900s and today’s legal approaches are, much as the medical diagnostic technology invoked 
in their support, in the words of Justice Blackmun, of “relatively recent vintage” (Roe v. Wade 
1973). Ancient societies across the world engaged in practices of fertility control through 
contraception and abortifacients and abortion was not commonly banned (Riddle 1994). Over 
time, building on Aristotelian ideas of embryology which described a process of gradual 
hominization and defined the “quickening,” the moment when the pregnant person first perceives 
fetal movement, as the moment in which life in the womb becomes human, laws began to shift in 
favor of restricting mid- to late-term abortions. English Common Law in the Middle Ages, for 
example, declared abortions a criminal offense only after the “quickening,” permitting them freely 
before (Mohr 1978). Across this time period, medical diagnostic technology remained limited and 
engagement with life in the womb rested generally on directly tactical physical perceptions and 
abstract metaphysical conceptions of life. Laws rested primarily on the authority of moral 
arguments rather than modern scientific or technical evidence. 
The late 19th century introduced a turning point, establishing the roots of the legal regime still 
in place today and unmistakably tied to the development of modern scientific-technological 
systems. In 1857, the newly formed American Medical Association (AMA) created a Committee 
on Criminalizing Abortion and adopted an unprecedented resolution calling on states to 
criminalize removal of any zygote, embryo, or fetus growing inside a pregnant person (Castuera 
2017). Growing from post-Enlightenment ideals of scientific rationality and built upon 
technological advancements, especially the stethoscope (developed in 1816), the doctors forming 
the AMA realized that the “quickening” was not the beginning of human life and conception and 
gestation constituted a continuous process of development. As science increasingly replaced 
religious doctrine as a source of authority in a widening set of public domains, especially 
education and law, the AMA’s medicalization of and technical approach to abortion caused key 
changes in public policy (Castuera 2017). Science attained an unprecedented level of cognitive 
authority as academic disciplines became operationalized and technical medical experts gained 
direct influence over policy unlike ever before, a result of the concentration of divisions of 
knowledge (Barnes 1985). Accordingly, restrictive abortion legislation gained traction in the 
1860s, first criminalizing abortion as a misdemeanor with only the abortion practitioner at fault, 
and then evolving into a felony charge with the pregnant person and the abortion practitioner 
facing charges (Crosby 1980: 357). These laws, which relied upon newly available technical 
knowledge in answering moral questions, remained in place until questioned by legal challenges 
in the late 20th century, namely Roe v. Wade (1973). 
Interestingly, medical diagnostic technology and the AMA’s technical approach to abortion 
also influenced religious perspectives in unforeseen ways, indicating the influence of science on 
religious morality as well as secular. With reference to the absence of direct discussion of abortion 
in both St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica and the Bible, Castuera (2017), argues that 
“religious dogmatism and ethical certainty on abortion were rare in the past and only became 
dominant themes in the 19th century” (121). This is clear when one considers that the Vatican 
became staunchly rooted in the belief that conception marks the beginning of the sanctity of life 
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only in the mid-1800s. Only after the AMA began to push their anti-abortion campaign did the 
Catholic church incorporate abortion into the framework of the 5th Commandment (“thou shalt 
not kill”) and declare abortion at any stage a grave sin with the rationality that “human life must 
be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception. From the first moment of 
his existence, a human must be recognized as having the rights of a person, among which is the 
inviolable right of every innocent being to life” (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith). This 
bioethical perspective, inspired largely by technical advances and AMA’s scientific approach to 
the moral question of abortion has held fast and many contemporary Catholic leaders remain 
staunch in their position that abortion is a “serious evil” and morally equivalent to homicide 
(Pacholczyk 2018). The influence of these ideas has permeated beyond the Catholic church into 
politics as well. 
In response to Roe v. Wade, various groups have challenged the assumption that viability 
constitutes personhood, often combining religious arguments with information only recently 
accessible with new technological advances. Especially influential in national politics, the 
Republican Party broke from a historically pro-choice position and adopted a platform in 1976 
that promised an anti-abortion constitutional amendment, with the assertion that the sanctity of 
life begins at conception (Williams 2011). This decision radically shifted national legislative 
politics and political culture and led to increased state-by-state legal restrictions resting on the 
treatment of an embryo as person from the moment of conception. Accordingly, states began to 
criminalize the killing of early embryos with feticide or fetal homicide statutes, recognized civil 
claims for damages against anyone who negligently causes the wrongful death of an early embryo, 
and gave early embryos all the rights and protections conferred on children (Peters 2006: 200-
201). With further development of medical diagnostic tools and the advancement of ultrasound 
technology, technical scientific arguments were employed to further support bans on early 
abortion. “Heartbeat bans” such as that introduced in Kentucky earlier this year which restrict 
abortion from the moment a fetal heartbeat is detected have gained popularity recently, drawing 
on data collected with the help of vaginal ultrasound technology (Heartbeat Bans Legislative 
Tracker).  
As evident in the historical shift in approach to abortion spurred largely by increasingly 
technical methods of analysis, technological artifacts, as manifestations of scientific theory, have 
a core role in shaping perspectives and carry an inherent political salience. In the translation of 
the ideas revealed with technology into public policy, technology has the indirect capacity to 
perpetuate hierarchies of power and therefore must be considered in their larger socio-political 
context much in the same way we do so with scientific truths. The context of abortion politics 
requires this particularly given the heavy reliance on medical diagnostic technology. Political 
theorist Langdon Winner (1986) proposes that technological advancements are not merely 
neutral aids to human activity, but rather powerful forces that actively shape human activity and 
meaning. In Winner’s view, technologies carry political significance because they shape 
arrangements of power and authority in society. Although many describe technology as neutral in 
the same way that scientific knowledge is viewed as neutral and objective, Winner makes it clear 
that technology is assuredly political and subjective, writing that “technology is [potentially] 
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implicated in perpetuating antidemocratic power relations” (7). In the context of abortion, this 
dynamic is visible in how the technological regime in place in a given historical context directly 
influences how politicians and religious leaders alike think about personhood and manage 
questions of reproductive rights, making claims of control over people’s bodies accordingly. 
Developments in ultrasound technology in particular reflect a key example of how 
technological innovation drastically shapes not only understandings of the phenomenon in focus 
but also broader social questions and power dynamics. To understand how dramatic the 
development of ultrasound technology was, we must first consider how the introduction of this 
technology created a shift in perception. Flower (1985) writes that, "If once the fetus was a 
stranger to us, such is not the case today. The fetal human no longer develops unseen but is 
photographed in utero...With the aid of ultrasound, a woman can view the fetus within her body, 
seeing it move about long before she will be able to feel its stirrings" (237). Ultrasound technology 
offered an unprecedented opportunity to “peer inside the womb,” in doing so radically altering 
not only norms and practices in pregnancy but conceptions of personhood and the bodily 
autonomy of people with the capacity for pregnancy (shortened PCP from now on). At its most 
dramatic, this new technological viewpoint has led some to view PCP in strictly reproductive 
terms, reducing the pregnant person to simply an objectified vessel for new life, lacking agency or 
subjectivity themselves. For example, incoming Florida house speaker Jose Olivia recently 
referred to PCP as “host bodies” five times in an interview with CBS News when asked a question 
about abortion, placing moral emphasis entirely on the fetus and overlooking the pregnant 
person’s fundamental personhood (DeFede 2019).  
Technological advances, in their seeming ability to show us a reality “more real” than that 
which we observe without the technology, also fundamentally change our relation to truth. 
Cultural anthropologist Lisa Mitchell (2001) asserts, like Winner, that technology, in this case 
sonography, is not passive nor neutral. Rather, she argues it changes our relationship to ourselves, 
each other, and larger metaphysical ideas of truth. She writes, “I look at ultrasound images not as 
neutral windows onto the fetus but rather as artefacts emerging out of particular historical, social, 
and cultural contexts” and encourages us to consider “the extent to which fetal images may 
engage, contest, and transform other meanings, for example about nature, technology, identity, 
normality, gender, and motherhood” (4). Viewing ultrasound technology in the way in which 
many view sonographic images - as a “neutral window” that lets us better “discover nature” - 
reflects a rationalist tendency to view scientific development as the key to understanding the 
abstract nature of the universe. Yet as I have discussed, this view is mistaken because it overlooks 
the fundamental subjectivity of scientific truths, as well as the broader impacts of technologies 
that stem from those scientific facts. Mitchell, like Kuhn and Latour & Woolgar, make clear that 
we must come to a better understanding of how technologies and the scientific knowledge they 
inform are connected with the surrounding historical, social, and cultural contexts. 
Scholars in the field of feminist technological studies (FTS) have done precisely this. In 
particular, they have considered how technology interacts with gendered social hierarchies and 
reinforces dynamics of power and privilege and how technological regimes are both productive 
and reflective of the surrounding cultural and political regimes. This is surely the case with 
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medical diagnostic technology such as ultrasonography. Taylor (2008) argues that ultrasound 
technology, in entering public consumer culture, has changed women’s perceptions of their own 
subjectivity and embodiment, which are now “rendered newly problematic by technologies of 
visualization” (29). Her use of the word “problematic” references the increased erasure of 
pregnant people’s agency from conversations about abortion, seen for example in Olivia’s 
characterization of PCP as mere “host bodies.” American Political Scientist Rosalind Pollack 
Petchesky (1987) similarly highlights the critical social and political significance of sonographic 
imagery in an analysis of how ultrasound photographs and videos operate within a larger “rhetoric 
and politics of vision” to increase the medical intervention in pregnancy that ultimately renders 
pregnant people as increasingly objectified and under state control. As the focus shifts to fetal life, 
adult pregnant people themselves become nearly invisible (or rendered non-human) given the 
emphasis on their identity in purely reproductive terms.  
This dynamic is visible in how the Christian Right and the Republican Party utilized ultrasound 
technology in their pro-life political strategy, beginning with the Women’s Ultrasound Right to 
Know Act (Rodrigues 2004). Inspired by a study that claimed that early fetal ultrasound 
examination increases maternal bonding and possibly resulted in fewer abortions (Fletcher & 
Evans 1983), they began pressing for mandatory ultrasounds in the hope that it would dissuade 
abortion. Rodrigues characterizes these measures as an intervention of gendered Foucauldian 
biopower, highlighting how women’s bodies and agency became increasingly under State control 
in the process. Rodrigues describes biopower as “the processes by which human life, which 
includes biological and anatomic ‘mechanisms’ as well as vital processes at the population level 
(e.g., birth and death rates), are rendered measurable and controllable by discourses, practices, 
and institutions of power” (57). In this framework, Right to Know measures gave the State 
increased permission to control PCP bodies while simultaneously diminishing PCP’s bodily and 
sexual autonomy. In this way, technology “mediated reality and the politics of gender and 
reproduction” (Mitchell 2001: 4). Therefore, discussion of the fetus and ultrasound technology is 
inseparable from talk about gender and power. Viewing medical technology in this light changes 
our understanding of scientific development and adds a critical layer to our understanding of 
abortion history. If we consider the technological regime as fundamentally tied to dynamics of 
power, it becomes clear that the increased technological management of pregnancy across time 
(by predominantly male medical professionals) has rendered PCP with less power and autonomy 
over their own bodies. We are thus presented with the question of what we can do to address this 
historic imbalance and create a more egalitarian and democratic future in which “as a matter of 
justice, people [are] able to influence the basic circumstances of their lives” (Sclove 1995: 25). 
AN ARGUMENT FOR PRIORITIZING DEMOCRACY  
Before continuing to suggest a possible path forward with regards to the role of science and 
technology, it is worth taking a moment to justify my preference for democracy and explain what 
I mean by the term. My preference for democracy is rooted in an understanding of strong 
democracy, in particular. Strong democracy, as theorized by political philosophers and political 
scientists, describes a condition in which citizens have access to power and say in society in a 
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substantive sense, giving them control over the conditions of their lives. Ample literature has 
suggested the urgent need to “deepen” democracy in societies around the world, emphasizing that 
strong democracy entails more than just establishing a set of policies and institutions that appear 
democratic in the minimal sense (Dewey 1927; Skopkol 2003; Rice et al. 2015; Crenson et al. 
2002; Cornwall 2002; Collier & Levitsky 1997; Gaventa 2006; Lukham et al. 2000; Fung, Wright, 
& Abers 2003). Gaventa (2006) pictures democracy as an ongoing process and explains the need 
to critically examine the inclusivity and substance of democracy, “especially in terms of how 
citizens engage with democratic spaces to create more just and equitable states and societies” (8). 
Along similar lines, Rorty (1999) claims we must be maximally inclusive of all citizens, 
“extend[ing] the reference of ‘us’ as far we can see.” Citizens’ participation in this framework goes 
beyond the “trivial role” of simply engaging in representational electoral politics; in a deep 
democracy, lay people have access to not only voting but the agenda setting process itself, built 
upon access to technical knowledge and the authority that comes with it (Sclove 1995: 241). Sclove 
suggests that deep democracy gains legitimacy, ostensibly over other forms of non-democratic 
governance (i.e. authoritarianism, oligarchy, dictatorship, monarchy), because “only democratic 
forums can supply impartiality born of the balance among multiple perspectives, the opportunity 
for reflection, and the full range of social knowledge needed to reach this determination” (38). 
Inspired by thinkers such as these, I am convinced that a strong democracy, in which politics is 
deeply participatory and responsive to citizens, there is a distributive access to authority over 
agenda setting, and citizens have substantive agency in political processes, is an ideal political 
arrangement. It seems to provide the best means of ensuring citizens are treated with dignity and 
equality. 
Relevant in the context of this paper with its consideration of medical diagnostic technology, 
sociologist S. Barry Barnes (1985), building on the work of German political philosopher, Jürgen 
Habermas, considers the role of technology in democracy. He describes two types of anti-
democratic societies that restrict access to authority and power and limits the public’s 
engagements with the agenda setting process. First, “technocratic” societies are those in which 
technical experts alone have direct control of political activity. In contrast, “decisionist” societies 
include a layer of political elites who mediate between the public and technological experts. In 
both cases, the great mass of society is largely still “depoliticized,” or effectively cut off from any 
real involvement in ongoing political activity (100). Barnes asserts the danger of falling into the 
trap of technocracy, in which important social questions become reduced to “small problems of 
management and maintenance,” and “society becomes perceived as a smoothly operating 
machine needing regular servicing and occasional repair” that only technical experts can provide. 
This monopoly over power is undesirable according to our framework of strong democracy and 
should be avoided when we consider how technology and science interact with public policy.    
A CONTEXTUALIST WAY FORWARD 
Informed by a commitment to a strongly democratic approach, I suggest we can ground a 
framework for moving forward with regards to abortion politics in an understanding of what 
American philosopher Stephen Pepper calls “world hypotheses.” An analysis using Pepperian 
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world hypotheses both offers a suggestion of what might be contributing to the challenge of 
answering the questions posed in the debate currently and gives us a more desirable way forward. 
Pepper (1942) proposes that four “world hypotheses,” each grounded in a root metaphor, explain 
how most people operate in and make theoretical sense of the world. They are broad collections 
of assumptions about the nature of systems and objects and their relationship to each other that 
dictate how people integrate information and how they approach problem solving. Mechanism, 
grounded in the root metaphor of the machine, is the world hypothesis that describes the 
dominant approach to abortion policy. Mechanism attempts to provide cohesive explanations of 
concrete phenomena and strives to makes causal claims, with the assumption that one can 
understand how the world works if one understands the “cogs” at play in the “machine.” A 
mechanistic approach suits most scientific endeavors well and is visible in the approaches taken 
by the biologists and policy makers with regard to defining fetal personhood and drawing moral 
claims from technical biological evidence. Most researchers studied a limited aspect of fetal 
development and attempted to explain a particular fact in depth by studying the parts at work in 
the fetal “machine.” Lawmakers and contemporary legal history reflect similarly mechanistic 
tendencies in their acceptance of and reliance on this purportedly concrete and cohesive scientific 
evidence, such as markers of fetal viability. Policy-making has restricted its focus to the technical 
question of when human life begins and attempted to answer that question by looking at specific 
information collected through technology such as ultrasounds or EEG, assuming that if we can 
come to technical answers we can create good public health policy. That emphasis has been the 
driving force, overshadowing the larger moral questions of agency and bodily autonomy. This 
singular focus on technical answers with limited involvement of other sources of popular authority 
reflects tendencies that are common in what Barnes called “decisionistic” societies, which we 
should recall are not strongly democratic given their concentration of power. 
An alternate world hypothesis, contextualism understands everything in the world to be 
operating in “intrinsically complex” and “interconnected” events (Pepper 1942: 233). In contrast 
to mechanism, contextualism is better suited to explain a concept in relation to the bigger picture 
and is less firmly rooted in an attempt to fit phenomena into a cohesive answer. I propose that a 
conceptual gap exists in the discussion of abortion between the proposed questions and the 
mechanism for answering, lending to the difficulty in using science in the debate around 
reproductive rights and morality. The question of when personhood begins is necessarily broad. 
It inherently contains considerations of justice, ethics, and personal freedom. So to attempt to 
answer it using a mechanistic approach that narrowly draws on a constrained collection of 
biologically evident information is a mistake. A purely mechanistic approach cannot possibly 
answer a resolutely contextual question, explaining scientists’ inability to conclusively do so. 
Moreover, there is a danger in an overly mechanistic approaching to this issue, as is evident in 
Olivia's “host body” comment. The constrained scope of mechanism can lead people to view 
pregnant people as fetus-hosting machines, incubation devices devoid of agency, rather than as a 
full people. Failing to look beyond the “cogs” thus carries the potential of objectifying PCP 
according strictly to their reproductive capacities and ignoring the critical importance of human 
dignity.  
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Beyond being too narrow, a mechanistic approach may simply be incompatible with the 
question, making any appeals to biological “evidence” in defense of moral claims purely 
scientistic. Hanlon (2019) describes “scientism” as the “untenable extension of scientific authority 
into realms of knowledge that lie outside the scope of what science can justifiably determine.” He 
argues that scientism constitutes an illegitimate appeal. Barnes (1985) remarks that, “the 
authority of science does not have unlimited scope. It does not extend to the realm of morals” 
(90). Thus, any attempt to do so is a scientistic misuse of scientific information and must be 
regarded with skepticism.  
All this is not to say science has no part in the making of policy, with regards to abortion or 
otherwise. Questions involved necessarily rely, in part, on scientific knowledge about the human 
body and technology has surely led to many social goods in our increased understanding of these 
processes of development and reproduction. We must only take care in deciding which questions 
are appropriate for the application of science and which are perhaps better answered by another 
type of knowledge, say lived experience. As Rorty (1999) writes, “there is nothing wrong with 
science, there is only something wrong with the attempt to divinize it, the attempt characteristic 
of realist philosophy” (34). In forming a cohesive policy, Pepper would recommend we employ 
instead an approach of “reasonable eclecticism,” drawing from various world hypotheses and 
knowledge bases to avoid dogmatism or concentration of authority that results if we remain in a 
strictly mechanistic worldview. Different problems and questions require different approaches. 
Recognizing that reality offers us a better opportunity to solve problems, according to the goal of 
fostering a strongly democratic society. Humphreys & Piot (2012), drawing on their extensive 
experience in the United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, assert that scientific evidence alone 
is not a sufficient basis for health policy, especially with regards to issues of critical moral 
significance. They write, “although science should inform health policy, it cannot be the only 
consideration” because “in a democracy there can be no experts on values.” Although they do not 
use Pepper’s terms, their conclusions highlight the importance and efficacy of a reasonably 
eclectic approach to health policy on a similarly controversial topic. 
With the understanding that technological artifacts have political salience, scientific 
knowledge is imbued in complex dynamics of power, and technical knowledge can be arbitrarily 
employed in support of political interests, we must approach abortion policy with a more 
contextualist approach that recognizes and incorporates other sources of moral and intellectual 
authority, especially that of everyday people who are impacted by policies. To do so requires first 
a reconsideration of who we consider experts on the matter and who we give authority over policy. 
Currently, abortion policy reflects a decisionstic tendency with technical experts holding authority 
and lawmakers relying heavily on biological evidence. If we wish to be more deeply democratic, 
that must change. Grassroots feminist activism has suggested another, more deeply democratic 
possibility and urges us to question who we are listening to as authorities on the matter. In 1969, 
the New York Joint Legislature Committee on the Problems of Public Health gathered to consider 
reforming the state’s abortion laws. Outraged that lawmakers were making this decision based 
solely on consultation with a panel of “experts” that included just 14 male medical practitioners 
and a Catholic nun, members of the radical feminist group, the Redstockings, organized a speak-
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out and protest. Disguised, activists infiltrated the hearing audience and then disrupted mid-
proceeding, shouting at legislators: “All right, now let’s hear from some real experts: the women!” 
(Mahoney 2015, my emphasis). The activists were removed, and the hearing was eventually 
moved to another room behind closed doors, reflecting yet again a decisionistic tendency that 
concentrated power and put a gendered monopoly on authoritative knowledge. Despite ultimately 
not changing the policy outcome, the Redstocking activists’ bold reframing of who should be 
considered “experts” with regards to abortion offers an important reminder about the value of 
citizens’ knowledge, rooted in lived experiences. This example reveals the critical significance of 
considering “the full range of social knowledge” in the policy making process. 
Consciously considering medical diagnostic technology’s relationship with democracy is yet 
another way we can encourage a strongly democratic approach in line with a more contextualist 
worldview. Historically, there has been a strongly undemocratic –and often openly misogynistic 
–approach to reproductive and gynecological technology with cis men hegemonically dominating 
medical research (intellectual authority), spaces of medical practice (practical authority), and 
policy spaces (political authority) (Bray 2007; Crosthwaite 2014; Miles 1991; Scully 1980). Given 
such a trend, adopting a more conscious approach with the critical awareness of how this 
technology has engaged in gender hierarchies across history is all the more urgent, assuming 
equality and justice are goals we choose to prioritize. Sclove (1995), in explaining the need for 
approaching technology with democratic design criteria, asserts that lay people, especially those 
impacted by the technology, should be involved in both the processes of technological design and 
policy-making that involves technology and science. In the case of abortion and medical 
diagnostic technology, that implies PCP’s roles have been vastly underrepresented, as the 
Redstocking activists highlighted in their protest. Using democratic design criteria could change 
that, in doing so simultaneously avoiding what Winner calls “technological somnambulism,” 
which describes the undesirable process by which we fail to recognize the profound political 
significance of technology and create or adopt technology without thinking about its larger social 
implications (9). It could help ensure that technologies and the policies resting on them pass what 
Sclove called the “reality test,” grounded in the daily experiences and concerns of everyday people 
that expert conclusions often routinely fail to consider in their overly technical approach to 
problem solving.  
Luckily, a more democratic policy-making process is already in practice in other contexts, 
offering a worthwhile example to consider. To cite but one example, Irish Citizen’s Assembly was 
established in 2016 as a groundbreaking “exercise in deliberative democracy, placing the citizen 
at the heart of important legal and policy issues facing Irish society” (The Citizens’ Assembly; Irish 
Citizens’ Assembly Project). With the help of expert evidence, 100 citizen members (from various 
backgrounds who were selected to be both random and electorally representative) considered the 
most pressing and controversial legislative topics, including abortion, gay marriage, and climate 
change. As a collective, they formed conclusions which were then outlined in reports and 
submitted to Parliament for further debate by elected officials. In the case of abortion, the 
Citizens’ Assembly recommended, with two third support amongst the participants, a reform of 
the current Eighth Amendment (which restricted abortion and inscribed an “equal right to life of 
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the pregnant women and the unborn”) to allow unrestricted access to abortions. Motivated by the 
Citizens’ Assembly report, a public referendum to remove the constitutional ban on abortion was 
put to popular vote and passed with over 66.6% support from Irish voters in May 2018. In a 
context where touching abortion had been viewed as political suicide by politicians give in 
controversial nature, this outcome stands as a stunning breakthrough for a seemingly intractable 
issue that nevertheless carries critical importance for the majority of the population.   
This example reveals the possibility of tangible legislative results coming out of such a process 
and the power of considering alterative models for deep democracy. Doing so can radically 
transform conversation around highly controversial topics by including the lived experiences of 
those impacted by policy. For example, one participant member of the Citizens’ Assembly 
explained that, “the members of the assembly were faced with expert testimony on medical and 
legal matters but also testimony from their fellow citizens whose lives were deeply impacted by 
the 8th” (Guardian readers and Bannock 2019). The result, as another member described, as 
increased empathy and the centering of “real people” in policy. Moreover, the process had the 
impact of encouraging citizen engagement and cultivating civic confidence, at a low in Ireland 
since the financial crisis of 2008 (Taylor 2019). By taking the debating of contentious issues “right 
back down into the hands of the people on the electoral roll,” it established the belief that this was 
a transparent process and that voting citizens “were not being preached at or lied to,” so often the 
case in politics (Guardian readers and Bannock 2019). Louise Caldwell, a participant member of 
the Citizens’ Assembly recounted the impact on public trust stating that, “I would definitely take 
part in a Citizens’ Assembly again. I felt empowered and informed – it gave me the language and 
skills to have difficult conversations” (Caldwell 2019). Another participant called it a “unbeatable 
process” and suggested Citizens’ Assemblies may hold the key to some of the most gridlocked 
political issues, such as Brexit. With the Irish example appearing an apparent success, perhaps it 
is time we in the US consider implementing a similar model. Of course, the context is vastly 
different, and it is not a matter of simply replicating the process exactly, but I believe we could 
benefit greatly by considering new political arrangements, or at least experimenting with new 
models, with reproductive health as just one arena that appears ripe for this approach. 
CONCLUSION 
It should now be clear that abortion laws are not and have never been pure reflections of 
scientific consensus but rather, “reflections of the interests of a given society at a given time” 
(Beller & Zlatnik 1995:482). This recognition is powerful as it allows us to move beyond naively 
rationalist concerns over scientific objectivity and questions of technical accuracy and into 
broader, more contextualist, conversations that are firmly grounded in the people’s lived 
experiences and hope for a better future. If we hold truth to be the “best pattern of action,” as 
Rorty (1991) writes, we can consciously embrace the subjectivity in knowledge and decide 
explicitly which values to base our truth on. I have argued democracy, dignity, and justice are 
worth upholding with regards to this moral question, so will base my concluding analysis on that. 
With those goals in mind, I argue we ought to consider how best to address needs in society and 
serve a maximally inclusive community, based on democratic design criteria that incorporates 
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sources of authority beyond technical medical experts. As abortion is inherently complex and 
interconnected with many other social considerations, any policy debate thus should incorporate 
consideration of surrounding dynamics of power and authority and how they engage with 
technology, knowledge creation, and law. Instead of getting caught up in questions of what 
constitutes human life and when life begins with reliance only on science and technical authority, 
a pragmatic and reasonably eclectic approach to abortion policy would suggest that we focus 
instead on a different set of questions: How are lived experiences being impacted by these 
policies? How are these technologies engaging in structural power dynamics? Do they deepen 
democracy with maximal inclusivity?  
These questions will re-center the dignity and agency of already living pregnant people and 
PCP, avoiding the danger of objectifying them in an overly technical approach. Feminist ethicists 
hold this as critical to any analysis of abortion, maintaining the pragmatic belief that “only by 
reflecting on the meaning of ethical pronouncement on actual women’s lives and the connections 
between judgements on abortion and the conditions of domination and subordination can we 
come to an adequate understanding of the moral status of abortion in society” (Sherwin 1991: 
757). A more contextual approach will require us to be more creative in our solutions. We might 
consider, for example, what drives people to receive abortions in the first place, what we might do 
to better support PCP’s sexual agency with birth control and sexual education, and how systems 
of poverty play a role in the dynamics of sexual agency. Make no mistake that addressing those 
interrelated and complex questions through policy process promises to be far more difficult than 
if we continued with a purely mechanistic approach. But I am resolute in my belief that doing so 
is nevertheless worthy of our time and energy, unless of course we are perfectly comfortable 
making policy that is undemocratic, misunderstanding of the nature of scientific truth, and 
actively engaged in perpetuating inequality; I would hope we are not.18 
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NOTES
1 This paper deserves a note describing my thought process as it relates to gendered language. Conversations around 
abortion and reproductive rights, both in academia and beyond, often focus on “women,” a term often used with the 
assumption that a “woman” is someone who has a uterus and can become pregnant. Yet we know that not all 
pregnant people are women and not all women have the capacity to become pregnant; both human biology and 
gender constructions are much more nuanced. What this means is that those who are impacted by restrictive abortion 
legislation are not reserved to “women.” Even if these policies were envisioned to target cisgender women with the 
capacity for pregnancy, transgender and gender non-conforming (GNC) people are impacted in very real ways. This 
reality highlights the interconnections between various forms of oppression, including misogyny and transphobia. For 
the purposes of this paper I will therefore be referring to People with the Capacity for Pregnancy (shortened to PCP) 
and “pregnant people/person” in an effort to be more inclusive of all experiences. I will use the term “women” when 
using direct quotes and referencing scholars who specifically discuss “women.” This approach may be imperfect but it 
is my best attempt. I gladly welcome any feedback from readers who have other thoughts on how best to navigate the 
complexities of language! 
2 As a last word, I would like to hold the space to acknowledge that this paper deals with a very personal matter. 
Despite my rather abstract approach to the topic of abortion, I want to remind readers that real bodies and real lives 
are directly involved, including my own. I am a researcher and a writer but I am also someone that can become 
pregnant and am thus directly implicated in the politics I describe throughout. For this reason, this research process 
was extremely difficult at times. Researching is obviously an intellectual act and less obviously to some, a political act. 
But it is also an emotional act. To uncover this logic of oppression and these stories of power impacted me deeply in 
very visceral ways. I share this honestly with you, my reader, because my experience in the research process is as 
much a part of this story I am telling as my “findings and conclusions”; it deserves recognition and inclusion. More 
importantly, it does not take away from my credibility as a researcher. I hope that by sharing this vulnerability, I can 
help open the door for greater discussions around researcher subjectivity and provide space in the often sterile 
hallows of academia for emotion and self-reflection. Let us not forget that researchers, just as those we write about 
and for, are human too.   
 
                                                          
